On Socrate's account of justice and the ideal state

 Q: What are the implications of this passage, both for Socrates’ philosophical, and political, views? Why is it necessary for his account of both justice, and the ideal state?

‘We both assert that there are,’ I said, ‘and distinguish in speech, many fair things, many good things, and so on for each kind of thing.’ ‘Yes, so we do.’ ‘And we also assert that there is a fair itself, a good itself, and so on for all the things we then set down as many. Now, again, refer them to one idea of each as though the idea were one; and we address it as that which really is.’ ‘That’s so.’ And, moreover, we say that the former are seen but not intellected, while the ideas are intellected but not seen.’

(Book VI, 507b)

The eternal realm of the Forms is the foundational to the entirety of platonic philosophy. In Book VI of the Republic Socrates argues for the existence of an ultimate good, the Form of the Good, which illuminates the remaining forms and allows them to be comprehended: “[the soul] fixes itself on that which is illumined by truth” (508d). The Form of the Good is superior to all other forms (“the good isn’t being but is still beyond being, exceeding it”)—it is what everything derives its essence from and what everything strives to be (509b). Just as the material realm is only perceptible because of the illuminating sun, the Form of the Good makes the truth and knowledge of the ideas possible to intellect by illuminating the realm of the Forms. The Forms cannot be interpreted empirically because they are eternal, universal, and superior to their physical and corruptible manifestations: “the ideas are intellected but not seen” (507b). If a good itself and a justice itself exist, it must be independent of social convention, the advantage of the stronger, and the approval of the city.

If a supreme idea of the good and the just exist, then convention, opinion, and the definition of justice proposed by Thrasymachus in Book I (“the advantage of the stronger”) are unhealthy deviations from the objective and universal order of the ideas (338c, 341b-d). Therefore, only those who can acquire the highest possible understanding of the Forms, including that of justice, can grasp the ideas and rule well (508e). To be just, the idea of justice must be known; otherwise, the changing opinions would barricade access to “delight in the nature of the fair itself” (476b). Those who are unable to intellect the ideas are limited to doxa, as only rational insight can access true knowledge and be just. A city designed and maintained by minds familiar with the ideas shall harmonize the reason, spirit, and desire of the polis (analogous to the sprit), resulting in justice: “we must let nature assign to each of the groups its share of happiness” (421b-c). The ideal polis is one that moves closer to and in accordance with the Forms, the world of ideas—the good itself.

Philosophers can access the Good because they are naturally inclined to philosophize (the tripartite soul is predisposed to reason), will not be distracted by private interests, and are tested by a vigorous education. The guardian class governs via reason, unlike the warrior and money- making classes who are dominated by spirit and desire respectively. Those knowledgeable must guide the lower classes of the city with their unique capacity to see the true order of the universe, not the forever changing world of Becoming, which is necessary to construct and sustain the kallipolis: “[non-philosopher isn’t capable of ruling the beasts in himself... [as such] he must be a slave of that best man who has the divine rule in himself” (590c-d). Therefore, the knowledgeable must be persuaded to capitalize on their knowledge and structure a society based that satisfy the aptitudes (“harmonizing the citizens by persuasion and compulsion... [to bring about a] commonwealth”), which are often corrupted, of all classes—a harmonious, just, and virtuous polis that maximalizes potential (519d-e).

For Socrates, what is best for the whole is best for its parts. Just as a limb needs the body to exist and to exercise in accordance with its natural purpose, the warrior and money-making class need rational governance to live healthy and just lives (590d). A city is like a body in respect to its experience of pleasure and the pain of an individual part, “the community of pleasure and pain bind it together,” as one unified sensation: “all of the [community] is in pain as a whole along with the afflicted part” (462c-d). Similarly, the polis struggles to establish justice when opinions differ and cause distrust between citizens: “some are overwhelmed and others overjoyed by the same things” (462b). The philosophers are the supreme point of reference for the city, a common tongue that refers to the singular good. Justice is no longer a matter of doxa, no longer a catalyst for conflict: “when one of the other parts gets control... it [pursues] an alien and untrue pleasure” (587a). Therefore, the construction of the harmonious and happy city depends on the governance of those who know and align with the Form of the Good.

Just as the rational part of the tripartite soul governs by deliberating on what is good for the entire soul, not what is best for a specific appetite, the guardians of the polis must govern in accordance with the common good in mind. Doing otherwise would permit the rational element of the soul to be subordinated by the irrational (“pushed on by desire...harvest pleasures stealthily”, creating a disbalanced and unhappy city unaligned with the Form of the Good: “the tyrannic soul is necessarily always poverty ridden and insatiable” (548b, 578a). Therefore, an attempt to support class preference prohibits the guardians from preforming their proper function: fostering a polis reflective of the Good. The warrior and money-making classes recognize that they are better off governed by the rational class because the happiness of the city and the soul is a product of justice—derived from knowing the Form of the Good—which ensures the stability of the city: “it’s better for all to be ruled by what is divine and prudent” (590d).